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《 特別寄稿 》




　The necessity to develop collections of big health data concerning an increasing 
number of persons, which allows studying groups with similar genetic structure in a 
homogenous manner is enhanced by the advancement of the new 4P medicine 
（personalized, predictive, preventive and, participative）. The EU General Data 
Protection introduces specific rules applying to the special categories of personal data 
such as health data taking place in the context of scientific research, this including 
genetic research areas. The new EU data protection regulation safeguards the 
development of research, but also require balancing this interest with the protection of 
fundamental rights. Genetic data may be used to block access to employment or health 
insurance. It is therefore necessary to preserve the right to control the use and the 
potential disclosure of data （i.e. informational privacy）, it is necessary to reform the 
existing models of informed consent. The analysis of famous disputes concerning 
genetic data protection could be a useful tool for studying new approach in data 
protection. The most important problem is to find good rules and practice on the 
relationship between the holder of data and biological group, especially the right to 
know or the right not to know genetic data.




1 . The Use of Biological Sample and the Lack of Transparency
　According to European legislation, provision of a biological sample is an act of 
transfer that can be defined as a donation. Generally, provision of the sample is free（ 1 ） 
as a consequence of the prohibition against using the human body and its parts as a 
source of earnings, a prohibition present in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights（ 2 ） 
and the Oviedo Convention（ 3 ）. The prohibition against selling the human body should 
be examined more deeply. In fact, it is connected with human dignity（ 4 ） and should be 
understood and interpreted in terms of this connection. Body parts undoubtedly are of 
economic value, inasmuch as they are a good requested for transplant. In Europe they 
are not allowed to be sold, on the basis of the value of dignity, but their use is not 
prohibited. Body parts may be taken from a living person to be given to another living 
person as long as there is no grave and permanent harm to the health of the donor; the 
legitimacy of the consent is founded upon the value of solidarity. Therefore, dignity 
and solidarity constitute the parameters that may be used to evaluate the merit, legality 
and efficacy of the consent. In the light of these parameters, consent to withdrawal of a 
sample can be considered a “self-serving promise”, because added to its causal 
justification is the advantage that the donor receives after provision of the sample. For 
example, a subject may consent to providing a saliva sample in order to have genetic 
（ 1）　See art. 3, comma 2, lett. c）.
（ 2）　See art. 3 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and art. 7 of the Recommendation R （2006） of the 
Council of Europe on research on biological materials of human origin）. Ferrando, Il principio di gratuità, 
biotecnologie e “atti di disposizione del proprio corpo”, in Europa dir. priv., 2002, 761.
（ 3）　See art. 21 according to which “The human body and its parts shall not, as such, give rise to financial 
gain.”
（ 4）　See artt. 2 and 6 UNESCOʼs Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights of 11 
November 1997, which provides that everyone has the right to respect for their dignity and rights 
regardless of their genetic characteristics and prohibits any discrimination based on genetic characteristics 
that is intended to infringe or has the effect of infringing human rights, fundamental freedoms and human 
dignity.
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mapping done for diagnostic purposes, or to have useful information about a 
relationship of paternity that binds him to another individual. The benefit expected is 
the grounding for the free provision of the sample, but even though the act is unilateral 
and free, it gives rise to a bilateral juridical relationship, inasmuch as it will give rise to 
knowledge of information useful for the donor. However, the collection of the sample 
could be the opportunity for scientific progress in the field of medicine through 
conservation of a sample and its analysis to gather information useful for researchers. 
In this case, consent would be motivated not only by egotistical interest, but also by the 
interests of solidarity, to contribute to scientific research. In this case, the solidarity 
justifies the free nature of the provision to the degree to which the donor has adequate 
information about how science will use the biological sample and the information 
drawn from it. It is no coincidence that the European Regulations introduce the 
principle of transparency, detailing this principle in a series of obligations about 
providing information in section I of Chapter III of the “European Union Regulation of 
the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of natural persons with 
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data on the 
protection of personal data” （RGDP）. The lack of transparency is a problem that is 
also very much felt in the United States, a country where genetics and genomics have 
been widely developed for some time. In fact, US jurisprudence has been called upon 
many times to evaluate the validity of free provision of biological samples in cases in 
which explanation about the use of the sample and information drawn from it was 
either absent or insufficient.
2 .  The Moore Case: The Economic Importance of the Human 
Sample
　In fact, when legislation permits human material to be patented, what was once a 
free provision may lead to commercialization of the results of the research conducted 
on the donated biological sample. A striking example is that of Mr. Moore, whose 
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surgically removed spleen was not disposed of as “waste,” but rather, because of its 
genetic peculiarities, was transformed into cellular cultures, the value of which in 1990 
was estimated to be three billion dollars（ 5 ）. The Moore case highlights the need to 
provide transparent information about preservation, use or elimination of the biological 
sample, even though in his case, the spleen was removed in his best interests, to heal 
his disease. Thus the informed consent form must indicate the use that will be made of 
the genetic information drawn from the biological sample, and must illustrate the 
possible exploitation for commercial purposes. In fact, the Moore case places legal 
scholars in front of a problem of the commercial value of human cells and genetic data. 
The researchers at the Californian hospital were able to make money from the cell lines 
developed from a part of Mooreʼs body by granting a license to pharmaceutical firms. 
Would Moore have been permitted to profit directly from his own cells by selling them 
to the researchers（ 6 ）? The Supreme Court of the state of California（ 7 ） ruled against this, 
but it is still a very topical issue because it reveals how the free nature of the provision 
of a biological sample does not mean that it has no economic value, but rather, is a 
gesture of solidarity not yet directed at a certain person, as happens in the donation of a 
kidney, but is a gesture of solidarity directed at present and future humanity, animated 
（ 5）　The quantification of the value was reported by P. Zatti, Maschere del diritto e volti della vita, Milano, 
2009, p. 13 s.
（ 6）　In the case of Greenberg v. Miami Childrenʼs Hospital Research Institute, instead, the request to 
participate in the profits came from a parent who had promoted a campaign for donation of biological 
samples from families in which there were cases of Canavan syndrome. The case, which never arrived at a 
decision because a settlement was agreed upon out of court, was based on the right of ownership of oneʼs 
own cells, and the absence of a specific authorization to patent the results of the research conducted with 
the donated biological samples. For a study of U.S. cases related to free nature of provision by a donor, see 
A. Magni, Riservatezza ed autodeterminazione nella partecipazione alla ricerca scientifica, Napoli, 2014, p. 
9 ss.
（ 7）　In 1990 the Supreme Court acknowledged the lack of suitable informed consent, but, overturning the 
previous decision of the Court of Appeals, denied that Moore had an ownership right to the cell line 
developed by the researchers.
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by the promotion of science and research. In this context, according to some 
orientations, the removal of the cells from the body generates a right to exploitation for 
scientific ends founded on a process similar to an expropriation. If the cells are a good, 
or in other words, if they are things that have rights and can be evaluated in monetary 
terms, ownership of them is granted to those who use them for research purposes. In 
this context, the use of the biological sample could happen without consent and not be 
paid for（ 8 ）, and in this case it would become a kind of common good（ 9 ）. On the other 
hand, others define the removal as a form of acquisition of the property through 
specification（10）: the cellular culture would belong to the researcher inasmuch as his 
intellectual work transformed the original good into another one, surely of higher 
value, but since they are human cells, on the basis of international and European 
principles, no compensation could be offered to the person who provided them（11）.
3 . The Research Purpose of the Data Donation and the RGDP
　Actually, the model of informed consent is the source of a relationship of duration 
that binds the person providing the sample to those who take it, use it and share it. 
Posing the problem of the “price” of the information granted could be the wrong 
approach. The absence of monetary compensation does not mean that the act of 
provision of the sample is without benefits, because the “donor” also gains in the 
process, through a diagnosis or the prediction of a possible disease. If the sample is 
（ 8）　V.M.C. Cherubini, Tutela della salute ed atti di disposizione del corpo, in Tutela della salute e diritto 
privato, a cura di F.D. Busnelli e V. Breccia, II, Milano, 1978, p. 94.
（ 9）　Thus G. Novelli e I. Pietrangeli, I campioni biologici, in Il governo del corpo, Trattato di Biodiritto, dir. 
da S. Rodotà e S. Zatti, vol. 2, Milano, Giuffrè, 2011, p. 1035 ss.
（10）　C. PIRIA, Interessi scientifici e patrimoniali su parti staccate dal corpo oggetto di ricerche 
biotecnologiche, in Rassegna di diritto farmaceutico, XXI, 1990, p. 808.
（11）　According to F. Mantovani, I trapianti e la sperimentazione umana, Padova, 1974, p. 337, the social 
function of ownership together with the obligatory duties of solidarity would justify laws that allow forms 
of taking biological samples even against the will of the subject.
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donated purely for research purposes, there is similarly an advantage, since the studies 
on the sample contribute to achieving the philanthropic goals of donor. In this different 
perspective, the relationship between the sample donor and the physician/researcher 
should be considered balanced, inasmuch as it can realize the interests of both parties, 
as long as the terms of informed consent were clearly explained. As highlighted in a 
case involving Washington University, owner of a biobank, the cell lines developed 
and commercially exploited by the University belonged to the University; the person 
who donated the sample for research purposes had not ownership rights over them（12）. 
However, the solution would have been different had the biological sample been 
provided for a use other than research: in fact, in this case, the law could offer 
protection to the ownership rights of the provider of the sample. For example, in the 
case of a bank of umbilical cords or baby teeth, the provision of the sample does not 
make the sample res nullius. Rather, it gives rise to a deposit that the biobank 
consequently has obligations to safeguard, to realize the interests of those who 
deposited the samples. An English Appeals Court（13） made a significant ruling in this 
regard, holding that a man who donated sperm to a biobank had ownership of the 
sample. The man was battling cancer, and the provision of the sample, far from 
dismissing ownership, was done to safeguard a fundamental interest, that of becoming 
a father once he had overcome his illness（14）.
　It is worth asking whether granting the use of the sample for scientific purposes 
automatically excludes the possibility of payment for providing the sample. The 
individual who provides the sample receives the benefit of a personalized medicine 
service and, as mentioned above, this form of medicine requires access to the personal 
（12）　In this regard see G Pascuzzi, U. Izzo, M. Macilotti , Comparative Issues in the Governance of Research 
Biobanks: Property, Privacy, and the Role of Technology, Springer, 2013, p. 150.
（13）　Caso Jonathan Yearworth and others v. North Bristol NHS Trust, Court of Appeal for England and 
Wales, 4 febbraio 2009, ［2009］ LS Law Medical 126
（14）　On this point see M. Stranger, J. Kaye （ed.）, Principles and Practice in Biobank Governance, 2016
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data of a vast number of other individuals, in order to calculate the probability of future 
diseases or the effectiveness of certain treatments. In this context, perhaps it is 
worthwhile to ensure that biological samples continue to be provided free of cost, not 
only because this respects the prohibition against using oneʼs body as a source of 
earnings, but also because society benefits from the progress of scientific research in 
this field. In fact, article 7, paragraph 4 of the RGDP indicates that consent is valid and 
worth safeguarding because it is necessary for the execution of the contract for services 
of personalized medicine, precisely because without the collection and evaluation of 
masses of data regarding the health of individuals, there could be no personalized 
medicine of any significance.
　In the European Regulations on privacy, it is possible to use data if the informed 
consent document contains at least one of the following specifications:
　　a） that the person involved resides in a nation that considers it legal to make an 
exception to the prohibition, with a detailed indication of the goals of the use 
of the data（15）;
　　b） that the use of the data is necessary in order to provide preventive medicine（16）.
　However, the first option may be problematic because personalized medicine, like 
other sciences, often requires the collection of massive amounts of information 
regarding genetics, health, behavior and lifestyle. For this reason, at the moment of 
taking the biological sample, it would be worthwhile to specify that the information is 
needed not only for the purpose of treatment but also for purposes of research, 
multiplying the goals for which the data from the biological sample may be used and 
perhaps shared among research units. On the basis of article 89, paragraph 2 of RGDP, 
（15）　Thus art. 9, paragraph 2, lett. a）.
（16）　Thus art. 9, paragraph 2 lett. h）.
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if the data are collected for research purposes, member nations can permit exceptions 
to the right to access, the right to limitation of use of the data, and the individualʼs right 
to oppose such use. In this context, one understands how important it is for the 
informed consent model to expressly indicate the possible use of the data for scientific 
research.
4 . The Italian Case of Ogliastra Population.
　Failure to mention the use for research could justify the donor in bringing suit to 
demand compensation; the donor could demand justice for not having been informed 
that the sample would not be destroyed after the use for which it had been given. The 
second option, about preventive medicine, also requires interpretation. While consent 
to the use of the data serves for prevention of a disease, it is necessary to keep in mind 
that the goals of study and research should be specified, because otherwise the use 
would be understood to be for the exclusive purposes of the sample donor. The 
ramifications of this problem were seen in Italy with the Sardinian project SharDNA. 
The Ogliastra area of Sardinia is one of five zones on the planet with the highest 
percentage of people 100 years old or older. In 1995, a consortium was formed with the 
municipalities of the area to collect and analyze the DNA of the inhabitants of this zone 
for research purposes. The Consortium gathered 230,000 DNA samples and involved 
14,000 volunteers, but when it went bankrupt, it granted its biobank to the San Raffaele 
of Milan. Later, with the financial failure of the San Raffaele, the biobank, which by 
this point was part of the patrimony of San Raffaele, was auctioned off and purchased 
by a London-based firm. When 25,000 biological samples disappeared, only to be 
found in a ward of a hospital in Cagliari, Sardinia, the Italian Public Prosecutorʼs Office 
became involved. Among the various charges it brought, there was also brought the 
charge of violation of privacy rights regarding the data. The case also concerned 
important aspects of Civil law, in that the consent for research purposes had originally 
been given for use of the data in a non-profit project. The British firm, which bought 
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the biobank for only € 257,000, must now request consent again, given the radical 
changes to the purposes for which the genetic information will be used. This case 
illustrates the importance of defining terms of biobank governance（17） that go beyond 
national laws to provide indications on the nature and tasks of biobanks and the 
relationships between biobanks and donors of biological samples and the information 
that can be obtained from them.
　In this sense, on the basis of the rules of ethics that govern scientific research, it 
might even happen that the use and publication of the research results could be made 
impossible because they were the fruit of an unauthorized use of human material.
5 .  The HeLa Case and the Need of Protection of the Biological 
Group Genetic Information.
　In addition, the use of genetic data could lead to very particular legal problems, as 
demonstrated by the well-known case of the immortal cells of Henrietta Lacks, a 
woman who had cervical cancer, and from whom a biological sample for research 
purposes was taken in 1951, without her consent. In March of 2013, a German research 
group made public the genome of the HeLa cells derived from her biological sample 
and still used by researchers in many places in the world. The genome was available in 
a database through the European Bioinformatic Institute and the NIHʼs National Center 
for Biotecnology Information. The descendants of Henrietta Lacks objected because 
the publication of the genome could reveal some characteristics they had inherited 
from her, violating their fundamental rights. The German researchers responded to 
their objections by removing the data from the database. In this same period, the 
journal Nature was evaluating the publication of a scientific work containing the 
genome sequence of the HeLa cellular line presented by a group of researchers 




financed by the NIH. In order to publish the article, Nature asked that the data about 
the genome be made public and Nature asked permission to publish the data about the 
genome, on the basis of the government funding received by the researchers.
6 . Conclusions
　The new European Regulation on privacy is really important because for the first 
time expressly includes the genetic data and the biological data in the specific 
protection offered by the law. In this way a special mention merits the 35 Cons. of the 
RGDP Personal data which clarify that health data “include all data pertaining to the 
health status of a data subject which reveal information relating to the past, current or 
future physical or mental health status of the data subject”. The definition of genetic 
data in art. 4, par. 13 is the result of the studies from European Working Group Art. 29, 
which in 2004 elaborated a document on genetic data（18）. But the real effect of this 
expresse mention in the new EU RGDP could be analyzed only in comparison with the 
praxis of the use of genetic data. The use of biological samples and data is mostly self-
regulated, based on the principles and rules devised in non-EU member states, because 
biobanks and companies operating the big health data are situated predominantly 
outside of the EU. Biological sample transforms into an electronic record, which can 
be shared and accessed by third parties in contractual relations with the biobank or 
technological platform managing the data. The new EU data protection regulation and 
the EU clinical trial regulation safeguard the development of research, but also require 
balancing this interest with the protection of fundamental rights. Genetic data may be 
used to prevent the development of a disease, but they can also be used to block access 
to employment or health insurance. It is therefore necessary to establish the appropriate 
（18）　See Working Document on Genetic Data adopted on 17 March 2004 by the Article 29 Working Party 
（WP91）, which refers to the need to also take into consideration and regulate the legal status of biological 
samples, which are also liable to be sources of personal data, among the necessary safeguards to be 
afforded in respect of genetic data.
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mode of using the data, their dissemination to third parties associated with the biobank 
or the platform, as well as safety measures adopted to protect not only the biological 
sample, but also the electronic record associated therewith.
―Lucia Ruggeri, Full Professor of Private Law at the University of Camerino, Italy―
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